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Prologamena to Thinking about Economic
Sanctions and Free Trade
David A. Baldwin*
Much has been written about economic sanctions, and even more has been
written about free trade. Before delving into the relationship between these
phenomena, it is prudent to clarify some concepts, identify some common
pitfalls to understanding, and place the topic in a theoretical and historical
perspective. This article will focus on economic sanctions with respect to the
following topics: (1) the nature of political sanctions; (2) why states use
economic sanctions; (3) common pitfalls in thinking about economic sanctions;
and (4) historical and theoretical perspectives on economic sanctions and free
trade.
I. WHAT ARE POLITICAL SANCTIONS?
Economic sanctions are sometimes divided into two categories"political" and "nonpolitical." The criterion for deciding which category
particular sanctions exemplify is defined in terms of the motives or goals of the
policymakers using the sanctions.' When economic sanctions are used to
influence another state's tariff policy or treatment of private foreign investment,
for example, they are depicted as "nonpolitical" because the sanctions are being
used to pursue "economic" rather than "political" goals. When economic
sanctions are used to influence another state's human rights policy or to get that
state to disarm or pay war reparations, however, the sanctions are categorized as
"political" because they are being used to pursue "political goals."
The practice of differentiating between "political" and "nonpolitical"
economic sanctions requires a criterion for distinguishing between political and
nonpolitical goals. If an example of such a criterion exists, it has escaped this
writer's attention. Unless such a criterion can be found, the distinction between
"political" and "nonpolitical" motives (goals, purposes, or ends) is untenable.

I
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93-95 (1997).

Chicagojournalof InternationalLaw

Definitions of "politics" take two forms. One emphasizes the state.
Politics, it is said, is about government.2 "Political" signifies that which relates to
a state, or a society of persons ... united for the purpose of government."3 This
conception of politics cannot be used to differentiate between the political and
nonpolitical goals of economic sanctions imposed by states. As activities of the
state conducted in pursuit of state goals, all economic sanctions are political
sanctions according to this perspective.
The second conception of politics emphasizes processes rather than
institutions. According to this view, politics is about social relations involving
power, rule, or authority. 4 Such a view implies little or nothing about particular
goals; any goal that involves power, rule, or authority would seem to qualify as
political. Numerous writers have echoed this view:
As a matter of fact the field of political activity cannot be defined, a priori,
by reference to particular objects. 5
Our definition says virtually nothing about human motives.6
7
The ends of politics may be anything.
The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run
the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might
possibly pursue. 8
The idea that certain goals are inherently political while others are not is
incompatible with the second conception of politics. Likewise, the idea that
economic sanctions can be classified according to whether their goals are
political or not is difficult-nay, impossible-to defend. Attempts to influence
the foreign economic policy of another state are political in the same sense that
attempts to change another state's human rights policy or military activities are
political. This is true regardless of the means used in such influence attempts.
Thus, neither of the two most common ways of defining politics allows
one to differentiate the political goals of economic sanctions from the allegedly
nonpolitical goals. Those who insist on making this distinction are obliged to
specify the conception of politics involved in making such judgments. None to
date has done so.
2

Graeme C. Moodie, Politics Is About Government, in Adrian Leftwich, ed, What Is Politics? The
Activity and Its Study 19-32 (Basil Blackwell 1984).
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Is this mere semantic nit-picking that has little to do with understanding
the role of economic sanctions in foreign policy and international relations? No.
Although politics and economics are not the same thing, they are often
intertwined in the real world. Thinking of the political and economic realms of
human affairs as separate and distinct-with no overlap-makes it almost
impossible to understand economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are prime
examples of institutions and policies in which economic and political aspects are
inextricably intertwined. They are, in other words, simultaneously economic and
political.
The attempt to treat the economy and the polity as autonomous spheres of
social life mirrors the attempt to treat war and politics as separate and distinct
activities. The point of the famous, but frequently misunderstood, dictum of
Carl von Clausewitz was not to glorify war but to subordinate it.
This unity [of politics and war] lies in the concept that war is only a branch
of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.
It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics-the
intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that
war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different
condition, ruled by no law but its own.
We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of
political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use
the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to
make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or
change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse
continues, irrespective of the means it employs ....Is war not just another

expression of ...thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar,
indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.
If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and
whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect
the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and
devoid of sense. 9
Properly understood, Clausewitz's words are as applicable to economic
sanctions as to military force. What distinguishes war, according to Clausewitz, is
"simply the peculiar nature of its means,"" not the ends being pursued.
Likewise, one could say that what distinguishes economic sanctions is the
peculiar nature of the means, not the goals sought by such means. Just as war is
a political activity, so too the use of economic sanctions should be viewed as a
political activity-regardlessof the ends.
Given the context of this symposium, it should also be noted that what has
been said thus far about economic sanctions applies also to legal sanctions.
9
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According to either of the conceptions of politics discussed above, the
imposition of legal sanctions is a political act in the same sense that imposing
economic or military sanctions is a political act.
If all of the goals pursued by economic sanctions are considered political,
the universe of episodes of sanctions expands so much that studying all of them
would be impossible. While this is true, it is not an argument for redefining
economic sanctions. One cannot study everything at once; thus, all researchers
must delimit the boundaries of their inquiry. It is quite legitimate for a researcher
to rule out consideration of the use of economic sanctions to influence
commercial or financial policies in other states on the grounds that the
researcher lacks the resources (time, expertise, research assistance, etc.) to
consider such matters. It is even legitimate to ignore them on the grounds that
one is simply not interested. It is not legitimate, however, to ignore pursuit of
such goals on the grounds that they are nonpolitical. This is not a tenable
intellectual position-unless accompanied by a conception of politics that
justifies such a rationale.
II. WHY Do STATES USE SANCTIONS?
Since there is a widespread belief that economic sanctions rarely work, one
might well ask why they are used. Three types of answers have been offered to
this question-cognitive, expressive, and instrumental.
Cognitive explanations often depict decisions to impose sanctions as
flowing from ignorance or bad judgment." Policymakers, some suggest, either
do not understand how to identify situations in which such measures are likely
to work, or they are fools. Such explanations are usually arrived at deductively
rather than empirically. Since "everyone," that is, the analyst, "knows" that
economic sanctions do not work, there must be something wrong with the
perceptions and/or the judgment of the policymaker who uses them.
Expressive explanations are based on a distinction between instrumental
and expressive behavior." Whereas instrumental behavior is depicted as
intended to influence others, expressive behavior has no objective other than the
release of internal tensions. Thus, although instrumental behavior is a means to
an end, expressive behavior is an end in itself. From the perspective of
expressivism, there is no need to analyze goals, since expressing frustration or
"blowing off steam" serve as both means and ends. Economic sanctions, then,
are used not because they are expected to work, but because they make the user
11
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feel better. Although purposeless foreign policy behavior may exist, it is
probably rare. This is simply because foreign-policymakers usually assume that
other countries are watching and because they care about the image those
countries have of them. Although temper tantrums by small children are
supposed to be the prototypical example of expressive behavior, it is interesting
to note that even they rarely occur when the child is alone.
The instrumental explanation treats sanctions as means to various ends.
This explanation assumes that most foreign policy behavior is purposeful. When
combined with the logic of choice, this approach provides a powerful
explanation for the use of economic sanctions-one that does not require
depicting policymakers as foolish or temperamental.
The logic of choice applies to situations in which policymakers must
choose how to allocate scarce resources among competing ends. In such
situations policymakers must consider the opportunity costs of their actions. In
such situations, choosing a low-cost policy alternative with a low probability of
success may not be foolish at all if the likely cost-effectiveness of otherpoli9 alternativesis
even less attractive. Making that choice may be the rational thing to do. For
example, military force may have the highest probability of success with respect
to getting a country to change its human rights policy or stop exporting arms.
Military force, however, is likely to be more expensive than economic sanctions.
In such a situation, it may be rational to choose the less effective and less costly
alternative of economic sanctions rather than the more effective but more costly
alternative of military force. Herbert Simon explains it as follows:
An administrative choice is incorrectly posed, then, when it is posed
as a choice between possibility A, with low costs and small results, and
possibility B, with high costs and large results. For A should be substituted a
third possibility C, which would include Aplus the alternative activities made
possible by the cost difference between A and B. 13
Although the judgment of foreign-policymakers is fallible and their
knowledge imperfect, the assumption that they are fools is not likely to be very
helpful in understanding the use of economic sanctions. Likewise, although it
may well be that nations sometimes engage in expressive behavior, most uses of
economic sanctions are better understood in instrumental terms. This
perspective necessarily entails an understanding of the goals being pursued,
especially if one wants to estimate the success of such undertakings. As the
following section will show, identifying the goals of economic sanctions is more
difficult than it seems.

13

Herbert A. Simon, Administralive Behavior179 (Free Press 3d ed 1976).
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III. SOME FALLACIES IN THINKING ABOUT
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The
economic
measures.
sanctions,
misplaced

single most important step in determining the extent to which
sanctions "work" is identifying and understanding the goals of such
Although there are many pitfalls in thinking about economic
only three will be discussed here: the single goal fallacy, the fallacy of
dichotomies, and the fallacy of simplistic symbolism.
A. THE SINGLE GOAL FALLACY

Individuals and nation states rarely, if ever, pursue one goal at a time. One
does not go to work solely in order to earn money, and one does not play golf
solely in order to get the ball in the hole. Likewise, nation states normally pursue
multiple foreign policy goals vis-A-vis multiple countries; they do not pursue one
goal at a time toward one country at a time.
The economic sanctions imposed on Fidel Castro's Cuba in the early 1960s
were described by Secretary of State Dean Rusk as having the following "limited,
but nonetheless substantial, objectives":
First, to reduce Castro's will and ability to export subversion and
violence to the other American States;
Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba that Castro's regime
cannot serve their interests;
Third, to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that
communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere; and
Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet
Union of maintaining a
14
Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.
This statement of goals is interesting in several respects. First, the target
countries included not only Cuba but also other Latin American countries and
the Soviet Union. Second, the goals were multiple. And third, despite the
common tendency to judge the success of economic sanctions against Cuba in
terms of their ability (or lack thereof) to topple Castro's regime, this goal was
not included. The Secretary of State even prefaced his statement of objectives
with an explicit disavowal that the policy was likely to bring down the regime.'"
Foreign-policymakers usually impose economic sanctions with more than
one goal in mind and more than one target country in mind. This is not to say,
however, that all goals are equally important. Policymakers are likely to attach
different priorities to different goals and targets. Thus, it is reasonable to think in

14

Committee on Foreign Relations, 1 East-West Trade, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, UnitedStates Senate: Eighty-Eigbth Congress, Second Session 13 (GPO 1964).

15
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terms of primary, secondary, and tertiary goals with respect to primary,
secondary, and tertiary targets.
This conception of foreign-policymaking calls into question the common
tendency to judge the success of sanctions solely in terms of the degree to which
the primary goal is attained. A given instance of economic sanctions may be
quite successful in attaining several secondary and tertiary goals even though it
fails to achieve the primary goal. Characterizing such instances simply as
"failures" can be misleading.
B. THE FALLACY OF MISPLACED DICHOTOMIES
The fallacy of misplaced dichotomies refers to treating as dichotomous a
variable which ought to be treated as a matter of degree. Thus, not only are
economic sanctions often evaluated in terms of a single goal, but the failure to
achieve this goal completely often leads to characterizing such sanctions as
"failures."' 6
This is objectionable on both practical and theoretical grounds. From a
practical standpoint, policymakers care about the degree to which sanctions
achieve their goals. They understand the difference between partial success and
outright failure. From a theoretical standpoint, "[A]ttainment of objectives," as
Simon points out, "is always a matter of degree."' 7 Although World War 11 is
regarded by most Americans as a success for US foreign policy, few would deny
that the war would have been more successful if it had been shorter or less
costly in terms of lives and money.
In judging the success of foreign-policy undertakings, the concept of
perfect or complete success is a snare and a delusion. This concept impedes
understanding and negates policy relevance. Foreign-policymakers understand
that perfection is beyond their reach. In deciding whether to use economic
sanctions, they want to know to what degree sanctions are likely to be effective,
with respect to which goals and targets, at what cost, and compared to which
alternative courses of action.
C. THE FALLACY OF SIMPLISTIC SYMBOLISM
The symbolic uses of economic sanctions seem to be a source of
widespread misunderstanding. Symbolic action is sometimes portrayed as what
countries do when they lack the will or the capability to do anything else; that is,
to engage in "real" or "substantive" foreign policy actions. Characterizing
economic sanctions as "merely symbolic" is a way of dismissing them by
implying that they are futile gestures, self-indulgent expressions of righteous
16
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indignation not really intended to influence others. They represent expressive
rather than instrumental behavior.
Symbolic behavior is not unique to economic sanctions. James N. Rosenau
contends that foreign policy "involves a degree of manipulation of symbols that
is unmatched in any other political situation."' 8 And Robert Jervis reminds us
that "[a] desired image . . . can often be of greater use than a significant
increment of military or economic power. An undesired image can involve costs
for which almost no amount of the usual kinds of power can compensate and
9
can be a handicap almost impossible to overcome."'
Economic sanctions are sometimes viewed as so useless and
counterproductive that they can be worse than "doing nothing." Even putting
aside the rather tricky question of what it means for a nation state to "do
nothing," this is misleading. As a practical matter, "doing nothing" means doing
what one would have done if the event provoking consideration of sanctions
had not occurred. In other words, it means carrying on "business as usual." And
countries that carry on business as usual when confronted by aggression (Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait), racism (apartheid in South Africa), nuclear proliferation
(India and Pakistan), or other violations of international norms are likely to
acquire an image as being indifferent to such behavior. If they take action to
avoid the acquisition of such an image, they are not necessarily behaving in a
frivolous or expressive manner.
It is often said that laws that are not enforced should be repealed, since
unenforced laws tend to undermine respect for the rule of law. Likewise, one
could argue that violations of international norms that go unpunished are likely
to weaken such norms. The use of economic sanctions to reinforce international
norms is not an alternative to instrumental behavior aimed at exercising
influence; it is instrumental behavior aimed at exercising influence. Strengthening
or maintaining a norm is not an end in itself. The point is to increase the
probability of behavior in conformance with such norms.
IV. SANCTIONS AND FREE TRADE
Are economic sanctions and free trade compatible? At first glance, one
might think the answer is obviously no. There are, however, two kinds of
arguments suggesting that this matter is more complex than it seems. One deals
with sanctions as trade liberalizers and the other with sanctions that protect
national security.

18
19

James N. Rosenau, Comparative Foreign Polfiy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?, 12 Intl Stud Q 296, 328
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A. SANCTIONS AS TRADE LIBERALIZERS
Strychnine is not normally recommended for ingestion by humans. There
are, however, a few conditions under which small amounts can save the lives of
people with heart problems (or so I have been told). Likewise, the judicious and
limited use of economic sanctions can be used to promote trade liberalization
and to strengthen a regime of free trade. Even Adam Smith recognized this
possibility:
The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how
far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods, is,
when some foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions the
importation of some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge in this
case naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties
and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures
into ours.
There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a
probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or
prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will
generally more than compensate the transitory inconvenience of paying
dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods. 20
Although Smith notes this possibility, he is skeptical since such policies are
likely to be carried out by "that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a
statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary
fluctuations of affairs.", 21 An updated version of this basic line of argument was
22
put forth recently by Robert E. Hudec.
Even the World Trade Organization recognizes the possibility that
economic sanctions have a role to play. When a member state is found to be in
violation of the rules of the liberal trading system, other states may be
authorized to impose economic sanctions against the offending state.
B. NATIONAL SECURITY AND SANCTIONS

One of the most longstanding exceptions to the doctrine of free trade
concerns national security. Adam Smith believed that "[t]he first duty of the
sovereign [is] that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of
other independent societies."2 3 Therefore, Smith observed, "defence . . .is of

20

Adam Smith, An Inquigy into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 434-35 (Modern
Library 1937).

21

Id at 435.
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Robert E. Hudec, Thinking about the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil in Jagdish Bhagwati

and Hugh T. Patrick, eds, Aggressive Unilateralism:America's 301 Trade Polio
and the World
23

Trading System 113 (Michigan 1990).
Smith, Wealth of Nations at 653 (cited in note 20).
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much more importance than opulence."24 Both Smith, writing in 1776, and John
Stuart Mill, writing in 1848, approved of the Navigation Acts, which restricted
trade on national security grounds.25 And even the ardent nineteenth-century
advocate of free trade, Richard Cobden, drew the line at the arms trade, which
he saw as a threat to peace.2 6
Since the mid-twentieth century, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") provisions have served as the backbone of the free trade
regime and seem to restrict severely the legal authority of GATT members to
use trade sanctions, at least with respect to other members. The agreement
contains a general prohibition on the use of import and export controls (Article
XI) and forbids trade policies that discriminate between GATT members
(Article 1). Article XXI, however, supersedes these prohibitions by declaring that
none of them should be interpreted "to prevent any contracting party from
taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests."27 Even before September 11, 2001, this provision constituted
a significant loophole in the GATT restrictions on the use of sanctions. In view
of the expansive conception of "essential security interests" espoused by the
United States since September 11th, it is difficult to imagine what actions are
ruled out.
Although the use of economic sanctions to promote national security
seems incompatible with free trade, this is not necessarily the case. During the
twentieth century, economic sanctions were used to combat Nazism,
Communism, terrorism, and other threats to international peace and stability. To
the extent that economic sanctions helped thwart such threats, they contributed
to the creation of conditions favorable to the spread of globalization and free
trade. Although sanctions may conflict with free trade in the short run, they may
facilitate it in the long run.
V. CONCLUSION
Any distinction between economic and political sanctions cannot be based
on either of the two most common conceptions of politics. Until a conception
of politics that would support such a distinction is identified, all economic
sanctions should be considered as forms of political sanctions-in the same way
that military, diplomatic, and legal sanctions are forms of political sanctions.
24

Id at 431.

25

Edward Mead Earle, Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, FriedrichList: The Economic Foundationsof
Military Power, in Edward Mead Earle, ed, Makers of Modern Strategy: Militag Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler 122-23 (Princeton 1941); Edmund Silberner, The Problem of War in
Nineteenth Centuy Economic Thought 62-63 (Princeton 1946).
Silberner, The Problem of War at 62 (cited in note 25).
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What differentiates these various political sanctions is their means, not their
status as political instruments. If war is politics by other means, then so too is
the use of economic sanctions.
Despite the common view that economic sanctions do not work, decisions
to employ such measures are not necessarily signs of foolish judgment,
ignorance, or impetuosity. Rational foreign-policymakers may choose economic
sanctions even when there is a low probability that they will achieve their aims.
The conventional wisdom about the futility of economic sanctions is
strengthened and maintained by a number of fallacies. Three of these fallacies
are (1) the belief that foreign-policymakers pursue one goal at a time with
respect to one target at a time, (2) the classification of sanctions episodes as
either failure or success without taking into account differences of degree, and
(3) the belief that symbolic actions have little or no instrumental value to
foreign-policymakers.
The relationship between economic sanctions and free trade is more
complex than it seems. As instruments of statecraft, economic sanctions can be
used to pursue a variety of foreign policy goals. Among the goals that such
measures can be, and have been, used to pursue is free trade. Although the
sacrifice of free trade in the name of national security has an ancient and
honorable pedigree, the tradeoff is not so stark as is often implied. International
political security enhances and facilitates free trade. To the extent that economic
sanctions are used to promote international political security, therefore, they
help to create conditions conducive to free trade and globalization.
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